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THE APEC AIR TRANSPORT SCHEDULE1
Abstract?
Introduction
The meeting of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Transport Ministers in June
1995 asked a small group of members to draw up a paper to identify options for ‘more
competitive air services with fair and equitable opportunity for all APEC member
economies’. This paper was prepared at a meeting of the Small Group in October 1995.2
The paper was submitted to Transport Ministers but it was not until this year at the 1997
meeting of Transport Ministers that the issue became active again. The 1997 ministerial
group asked the Small Group to reconvene to provide more advice on ‘priorities’ among
the list of options that it had prepared. It is argued below that the original paper raised
some of the important issues in this sector but that it could have gone further, and that
certainly some of the ideas require elaboration before the proposals can be ordered into
priorities. The aim of this paper is to present a framework in which a fuller set of options
can be generated and evaluated. It is also intended to illustrate the application of this
framework with a set of suggestions for an APEC agenda (see Table 3 for a summary of
those suggestions).
The next section of the paper outlines the nature of the current regulatory
arrangements for international aviation. There follows a discussion of some of the
pressures for change in the system. The policy options suggested by APEC’s Small Group
and those proposed by a number of other reports are then examined in the context of this
review of the features of the system and the forces for change. The paper concludes with
suggestions about APEC’s air transport ‘schedule’.
Regulatory features
The regulation of international trade in air transport services is one of the dinosaurs of the
world trading system. Its elaborate structure of bilateral agreements fixes a set of rules
which:
· identify the airlines of the contracting parties with the rights to fly on each route;
· determine the capacity that can be provided by each of those designated airlines; and
· limit the capacity that can be offered by airlines from third countries.
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The system therefore imposes a set of country-specific quotas in each market, where
markets are defined in terms of routes between pairs of countries and in terms of the two-
way traffic flow. This structure is clearly a long way from free trade in air transport
services, yet the jargon of the system implies the opposite — the rights exchanged in these
bilateral agreements are called the ‘freedoms of the air’!
The origins of the system are important to consider in the process of thinking about
alternatives. In the mid 1940s, when today’s regulatory structure was created, the concern
was that countries’ control over entry into their air space would leave citizens of other
countries ‘at their mercy’. Countries might try to extract rents from their ability to control
entry into the market (Findlay, Bora and Forsyth, 1996). That ability arose from a
country’s control over entry into its own air space, and from the lack of perfect substitutes
for any one route. The consequence would be a non-cooperative game, in which both ends
of the route tried to apply taxes of some sort (or gather rents in other ways) from the
market. The players could perceivably, after the game had been played, be worse off. To
avoid this outcome, countries agreed to not exploit their market power. They did so by
agreeing to exchange rights of access.
In principle this exchange of rights of access could have been arranged in a
multilateral fashion. It turned out that, for other competition policy reasons — such as
concerns about the potential domination of the market by US carriers, who had the
technological edge at the time — such an agreement was impossible (Shane, 1993, Fukui,
1993). Countries instead decided to exchange rights in a series of bilateral agreements.
The bilateralism involved in the structure introduces some special features. Since the
commitments were exchanged bilaterally, some method of coping with third countries had
to be considered. The purpose of the agreements was to extract some ‘concession’ from
the other side, in this case, a commitment to not exploit market power. A country would
not willingly give up its option to do so without some commitment by the other party. It
would not therefore extend a commitment made to one party to all others on a ‘most
favoured nation’ basis. The effect is that a pair of countries agree to give preferential
access to each other’s airlines in particular markets. The preference system is administered
by quantitative restrictions on the entry of third parties.
Markets in this case, as noted already, are defined in terms of a set of routes between
two countries involved in a bilateral negotiation. This definition of the market, as it
emerges from the regulatory process, is not necessarily consistent with an economic
definition of the market. It is impossible to completely prohibit access by third parties
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since few routes operate in complete isolation. Substitute routing through other countries
is often available. However, as also noted above, attempts are made to cap the
involvement of third parties.3
Preferential trading arrangements will generally operate on the basis of some rules of
origin. A decision has to be made on which items are to be given preference. The usual
rule is that, in merchandise trade, the item be primarily constructed in a partner country.
However, air transport is a service, and what moves across borders is not a finished
product but the capacity to provide the service. A rule of origin of the type applied in
merchandise trade is difficult to apply so the system relies on a rule of ownership instead.
The bilateral agreements will recognise airlines of other countries as long as those airlines
are substantially owned and effectively controlled by the citizens of those countries.
Forces for change4
There are pressures for change in the regulatory system from a number of sources
including:
· the conflicts between bilateralism and the multilateral principles of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);
· the increasing weight put on consumer interests in policy making;
· the rising administrative costs of bilateralism; and
· a shift in airline attitudes to bilateralism.
The regulatory system in air transport clashes with many of the principles of
multilateralism. Rights are negotiated on a reciprocal basis with the aim of achieving a
‘balance of opportunities’ between the two sides. It does not therefore treat all trading
partners in a non-discriminatory way. It also discriminates between foreign trading
partners and domestic firms in terms of market access. As a result, the current
arrangements deny some of the potential gains from international trade in this service.
There were attempts to have air transport included in the agreement which emerged
from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, but the parties agreed to
include only some marketing and ground service components: namely, aircraft repair and
maintenance, air travel agents and computer reservation systems. Market access questions
were not included.
The multilateral system has not stopped giving air transport its attention. The World
Trade Organisation is committed to reviewing the sector some time over the next five
years. In anticipation, other multilateral institutions, including the Organisation for
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have worked on the issues (OECD,
1997).
Because of these multilateral forces, greater scrutiny of the regulatory system and its
effects on trade can be expected. These initiatives will be strongly supported by the
tourism industry — in particular, those parts of the tourism sector which rely on inbound
tourists and which stand to gain from further improvements in real fares and efficiency —
in many economies.
Local consumer influence, such as that of outbound passengers in highly regulated
markets, is also increasing. This pressure in the Asia Pacific region is argued by Oum
(Oum 1997) to have been made explicit in many economies in the region. The effects
have been significant. For example, it is argued that this pressure contributed to defining
the characteristics of the new United States – Canada agreement.
These forces for reform may also be supported by suppliers of other inputs into the
industry, such as firms involved in the planning, construction and management of airports,
and others such as aircraft suppliers.
There is also an administrative issue. The bilateral system is relatively more
expensive to administer in high growth markets. Agreements have to be renegotiated
frequently, which places a burden on governments and on airlines.
Findlay (Findlay 1996) argues that, among the airlines, interests in reform are mixed
but the number in favour of change is increasing. The context is the rise in the intensity of
competition in the market, even in the presence of regulation. Consumers, especially in
rapidly growing or dense markets, such as the Asia Pacific, now have more choices. There
are now more routes, and therefore more options, for travellers. There are also more
operators, leading to a rise in the frequency with which countries designate more than one
carrier to operate their international routes.
The bilateral system imposes constraints on airline operations. It restricts airlines’
rights to enter new routes and to construct new networks. It inhibits their ability to
relocate offshore to reduce costs.
Airlines try to minimise the impact of these constraints. They use marketing alliances
and code-sharing, and various types of sub-contracting. For example, seats may be
purchased on lower cost carriers and then sold on to travellers by the major airline which
has made the bulk purchase. Detailed contracts which specify the contribution of each
party to the arrangement and how each side will respond to various contingencies might be
a substitute for a higher degree of ownership and control.
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Airlines incur costs in the pursuit of these strategies. These include the costs of
contracting in situations which otherwise might have been managed completely within a
firm. Some airlines are happy to bear those costs, since there is an offsetting benefit — the
bilateral system also constrains their rivals. But, as the intensity of competition increases,
the value of the protective effect of the system is expected to fall.
Oum (Oum 1997) observes some other forces which might also highlight the
constraints imposed by the regulatory system. These are the challenges from:
· the change in the cost competitiveness of Asia Pacific airlines and, in particular, the
diminishing input price differentials in favour of the Asian carriers, which will add to
the pressure to seek more options for adjustment; and
· the global alliance airlines which are setting up networks with more than one hub
spanning entire continents at the same time as acquiring ownership shares in the
feeder carriers — Asian carriers by contrast have so far achieved more limited alliance
networks and Oum argues the current regulatory regime in Asia fragments the region
and makes it more difficult for airlines to build networks there.
Policy options
Table 1 summarises the set of policy proposals that have been recommended or considered
in a series of recent reports and papers. The sources are a report by Findlay, Paredes-
Molina, Kim and Raguraman (1995) of a meeting hosted by four PECC members to
consider these issues, the OECD (1997) report, Findlay, Hufbauer and Jaggi (1996), Oum
(1997), and the report of the APEC Small Group. The market access proposals are
summarised in more detail in Table 2 (other proposals are more easily interpreted by their
titles). An apparently obvious solution is to adopt what the OECD calls a ‘Big Bang’
(OECD p. 117); that is, to accept the relevance of the GATS principles, apply that
agreement to air transport, and deal with any competition policy issues that arise using
more appropriate instruments than the current regulatory system.
A feature of these tables is the wide range of suggestions. Apparently the authors of
these various reports have decided that the Big Bang may not work.5 The OECD explains
why, in terms of:
· the affect of reform on private interests — in particular, the resistance shown by some
potential losers from a move to a more liberal system;
· national perceptions of airline interests and the extent to which gains are more likely
under the sort of reciprocity that characterises bilateralism;
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· constraints imposed by accepting the roles of existing institutional structures; and
· an unwillingness to permit foreign establishment in this sector or to permit foreign
carriers to operate on domestic routes.
The OECD identifies a number of paths of transition to air transport liberalisation which
would ‘avoid doctrinaire solutions (and) rather ...seek pragmatic ways forward’ (OECD p.
121). While the OECD notes the benefits of grouping air transport with other services
(OECD p. 120), it appears to be accepting that negotiations concerning this sector are
likely to take place in isolation and that therefore rapid change is less likely (pressure from
losing interests cannot be offset by gains from reforms in other sectors). Consequently
change is likely to be incremental.
Policy proposals can be divided into 6 groups:
· the choice of a system of rules;
· reform within bilateralism;
· multilateral models;
· ownership;
· competition policy; and
· dispute settlement.
A system of rules
The bilateral system operates on a set of rules that are contrary to those of other aspects of
the international trading system. A reiteration of the relevance of the GATS principles to
air transport is valuable. It helps maintain the presumption that air transport should be
covered by the GATS and assists the assessment of more ‘pragmatic’ proposals. A
reiteration of that point within APEC would also reinforce the principle of
comprehensiveness in the APEC commitment to free and open trade and investment.
Reform within bilateralism
A number of reforms have been proposed within the bilateral structure. The first of these
is to grant automatic exchange of the rights of market access to carriers based in the
negotiating countries (called third and fourth freedom rights). Restrictions on the number
of carriers and also the capacity that each carrier could offer would be lifted. The entry of
carriers from third countries would remain restricted. The APEC Small Group in its 1995
report suggested there be more consideration of the scope for achieving more open market
access by reform within the bilateral system.
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An example of this approach to reform is the US Open Skies arrangement. The
United States has signed these agreements in the Asia Pacific region with Singapore,
Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and New Zealand. Negotiations are continuing with Korea. The
United States has also applied this strategy in Europe and has signed an Open Skies
agreement with Canada.
The nature of an Open Skies agreement can be illustrated with the use of Figure 1.
Suppose the Unite States signs Open Skies agreements with countries A and B. Then the
US airlines and those of the signatory country have free access on the route between them.
These Open Skies agreements also generally provide each party with automatic beyond (as
well as intermediate) rights. That is, the US airlines have the right to pick up traffic in
countries A and B and carry it to other destinations, subject to the agreement of those
destinations. This will be possible for US carriers on the route between A and B, in both
directions, as a consequence of each of those countries signing an Open Skies agreement.
That is, the US carriers have free access on all the routes in Figure 1. However, airlines of
country A or B have free access only on their direct routes to the United States, and not
between themselves (unless they share a similar agreement to that negotiated with the
United States). The US carriers therefore have access to the whole network as a
consequence of these bilateral negotiations. In order for airlines of countries A and B to
have access a bilateral agreement between them would have to be negotiated as well.
Furthermore, the agreements do not cover cabotage. Therefore the US carriers have
the advantage of being able to draw on their extensive domestic networks, to which Asian
carriers do not have direct access. As explained, the US carriers also have the flexibility to
create networks between signatories in Asia whereas, unless those Asian countries have
established similar agreements, their airlines do not.
The Open Skies agreements of the United States are an example of a ‘hub and spoke’
approach to regulation. One criticism of that approach has been that it is inherently
discriminatory. This strategy certainly maintains the discrimination against third parties
that is a feature of aviation bilateralism. It is not discriminatory, however, in the sense that
some countries are precluded from engaging in negotiations. Nor do the terms of the
agreements differ significantly. But a consequence of signing a sequence of these
agreements is that the US carriers are systematically advantaged.
The agreements will have the effect of diverting traffic to the more open routes. For
example, an agreement between the United States and Korea could have the effect of
diverting travellers from the Japan – United States route to travelling to the United States
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via Korea.6 The loss of traffic on the direct route would impose costs on the Japanese
airlines and have an impact on their attitude to negotiations with the United States on the
direct route. Strictly, this sort of traffic diversion is an example of the disadvantage in
efficiency terms of piecemeal reform, but proponents of the strategy, such as the United
States, would argue it had advantages in terms of the political economy constraints created
by limiting the scope of negotiations to this sector alone.
Another example of a liberal bilateral arrangement is that between Australia and New
Zealand. It differs from the US model in two ways. First, the trans-Tasman agreement
includes cabotage. Airlines of either country can therefore enter the other’s domestic
market. Second, the agreement is quarantined beyond rights. So in one dimension the
trans-Tasman agreement is more liberal, but in another it is not. Furthermore, while the
negotiators may not have set out to achieve it, the interaction between the negotiations and
the identities of the airlines’ owners has had the effect of relaxing the limits on foreign
ownership of airlines of both countries.7
A further option under bilateralism (which could also be dealt with using the
mechanisms discussed in the next section) is to focus on the charter market. The APEC
Small Group suggested this as an option. This option might be attractive in the Asia
Pacific region, given the expected growth of tourist traffic, the seasonal variations in
traffic volumes and the interest of some of the region’s airlines in establishing and
operating ‘no-frills’ services.
Multilateral
A preferred route to reform is to construct multilateral structures. But how could this be
done? The ultimate solution is to have air transport covered by the GATS. But if it is
accepted that there are constraints to reaching that outcome directly and quickly, are there
alternative routes which groups of countries can pursue and which can be argued to be
consistent with the GATS and therefore, ultimately, liberalising?
One model of how to proceed has been suggested by Snape (Snape 1996), who
stresses the importance of the membership rule as a test of openness of regional
arrangements which apply to ‘deeper’ forms of integration. He notes that regional
arrangements may cover new measures not now covered by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Those parts of the agreements may not be inconsistent with
GATT principles even if only sub-groups of the signatories to the regional agreement take
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action of this type. But this is the only case, he argues, as long as the other signatories to
the regional agreement can join on comparable terms (Snape p. 52).8
Snape does express some concern however about industry specific approaches to
reform — for example, restricting negotiations to one sector, such as transport. Other
experience of such arrangements, he argues, runs a greater risk of regulatory capture by
producer interests in that sector seeking to protect themselves against competition from the
rest of the world. This is precisely the risk involved in retaining bilateral arrangements in
the air transport. Snape concedes, however, that openness to new members offers a
safeguard against this happening.
The implication of this perspective is that groups of countries could negotiate liberal
arrangements for the exchange of market access in air transport. The outcome would be
regarded as liberalising as long as the membership criterion — that is, new members could
join on the same terms as foundation members of the group — was met.
There are a number of ways in which an arrangement consistent with this principle
could be established within the APEC region. One is that those countries who have signed
Open Skies agreements with the United States could agree to multilateralise them in this
way. Indeed a recent seminar discussion in Washington raised the possibility that a test of
the United States’ intentions in negotiating the Open Skies agreements would be to work
to liberalise them multilaterally by this method (McFadyen, 1997).9 The APEC process
could be used as a venue for those discussions, in which case other economies might wish
to join.
Another strategy would be to pursue air transport objectives through the agendas for
the development of existing regional trading arrangements. This might mean including air
transport in regional arrangements (the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) or North
American Free Trade Agreement, for example) from which it is generally excluded, and
going further than this to ‘dock’ the air transport provisions in one regional arrangement
with those in another.10 The extension of the treatment of air transport in Closer Economic
Relations to the AFTA economies is an example. APEC’s role in this case would be to
monitor the commitments made and to comment on their contribution to the Bogor
objectives. Parties to the arrangements would list their commitments in this sector in their
Individual Action Plans.
Another route to reform within this set of options is to focus on the freight sector. As
illustrated in Table 1, a number of commentators have proposed liberalisation of the
freight sector as a first step toward broader reform. The freight sector might attract less
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resistance than the passenger sector (because of its lesser importance to some carriers who
might be greater losers from new arrangements) and experience in that sector would
generate information about the effects of reform which would be useful in the debate
about passenger market liberalisation. The APEC Small Group also nominated freight as a
sector worth special attention and suggested the issues in that sector be examined by a
group of experts. But, in some cases, freight issues have been contentious.11 For this
reason, the PECC has suggested that a multi-modal approach to freight sector reform
would be preferable on efficiency grounds and might also generate enough support to
surmount resistances from operators of some modes in some economies (Pangestu,
Findlay, Intal and Parker, 1996 p. 25).
Other proposals
A series of complementary policies have also been proposed. The first concerns ownership
rules. As explained above, caps on foreign ownership of airlines are a critical component
of the regulatory structure. Without those caps the identity of airlines could not be
determined and their eligibility for market access under the bilaterals would be undecided.
However, these caps are generally rising. Already, as a consequence, the question of
whose interests the protective arrangements are serving is being raised. Apart from this
source of pressure, air transport will eventually be captured by the application of APEC’s
non-binding investment principles. Strict application of those rules would render the
bilateral structure ineffective. The APEC Small Group was also concerned about the
interaction between work on investment liberalisation and policy in the air transport
sector.12
The second concerns competition policy. The argument that the current regulatory
system was an early example of an attempt at a coordinated competition policy suggests
that attention to competition policy issues will also be important in the transition to new
arrangements. That objective of the transition is to implement a more efficient form of
competition policy that does not have the protective effects of the current arrangements.
Some of the original concerns about the domination of particular routes by some carriers
may still be present. But more pressing current competition policy issues include:
· the market power of carriers involved in alliances or code-sharing arrangements13;
· the methods for adopting a multiple designation policy14;
· access to infrastructure, including airports15; and
· the extent of state aid.16
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Principles for dealing with these issues might also be examined within the APEC process.
An example might be whether policies actually have to be centrally coordinated or
whether the ability of regulators in one country to seek action by their counterparts in
another is sufficient.17 The APEC Small Group was also concerned about the competition
policy issues associated with ‘doing business’ matters, with multiple designation (which it
wanted to encourage); about removing any residual controls on fares (minimal in any
case); and about cooperative agreements between airlines (which it encouraged subject to
anti-competitive effects).
The third complementary policy topic is dispute settlement. Findlay, Hufbauer and
Jaggi (1996) note that civil aviation is not covered by the GATS dispute settling
mechanisms and observe that while bilateral agreements have arbitration clauses those
clauses are not binding. As a consequence disputes can flare into ‘wars’, where the
combatants actually threaten each other with sanctions. They suggest that APEC consider
devising its own dispute settling mechanism for this sector, incorporating the following
characteristics:
· the system would be open both to APEC members and to individual carriers;
· APEC members and carriers not party to the dispute would still be able to submit
briefs;
· member panels would be appointed by elements of the APEC process, not by the
parties to the dispute;
· panels would have to report within a particular time period; and
· a consensus would be required to reject a panel’s findings.
Conclusion: APEC schedule
The APEC Small Group in its discussion so far has examined many of the key issues in
the sector. It could however go further by operating within a richer framework for
considering reform in this sector. An attempt has been made here to define such a
framework and the discussion of proposals and an APEC agenda of initiatives is
summarised in Table 3 (the scheduling aspect is discussed below). APEC priority areas are
highlighted by the shaded boxes. The table also includes some boxes which are not shaded,
indicating initiatives which might be taken unilaterally or bilaterally. Some comments on
the likely gains from these initiatives and their possible contribution to the liberalisation of
this sector are offered in the table. The APEC priorities are divided into two groups, one
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in which APEC’s contribution is to provide a framework in which regional or sub-group
activities take place and the other in which APEC has a more active role.
The framework approach could include re-asserting the relevance of the GATS
principles to air transport, making clear the impediments to international trade in this
service, monitoring the terms of any agreements on air transport amongst its members,
commenting on competition policy principles which might be applied and asserting the
relevance of its investment principles to this sector.
A more active role would have APEC doing all these things plus providing a forum
in which US Open Skies might be multilateralised, pursuing the PECC proposal for free
freight markets amongst its members, creating the momentum for air transport to be
included in the GATS, asking its Transport Ministers to coordinate the introduction of slot
auctions for air space where necessary, and establishing a new dispute resolution system.
Providing a framework in which its members might pursue air transport
liberalisation does not rule out APEC’s also being an active participant in the process.
These are not alternatives, since both can be pursued, but parts of the former are a
prerequisite for the latter. Also active participation by the whole of APEC may tend to
hinder any efforts at the sub-regional level, so that APEC’s priority role in the short term
would be to provide the framework within which those sub-regional initiatives could be
evaluated.
Another point is that the timing of APEC’s contributions may differ — the departure
times for all these efforts could be immediate but the arrival times would vary. Factors
likely to contribute to that variation are the time required to do the necessary analytical
work on some topics, and the effort required to convince APEC members, or a critical
mass of members, of the value of an initiative. The research community continues to play
a vital role in this work, particularly in terms of measuring the costs and benefits of
liberalisation options.18
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Table 1 Summary of policy proposals
Policy proposal FPKR
(1995)
OECD
(1997)
FHJ
(1996)
Oum
(1997)
APEC
(1995)
Market access issues issues
rules
Accept GATT/GATS principles
within bilateralism
Grant automatic 3rds and 4ths
Open charter markets
Permit open skies at 2nd airports
multilateral
Set up regional clubs
Free freight markets
Apply GATS
Other issues
Relax foreign ownership rules
Coordinate competition policy, eg
· review rules on alliances
· adopt multiple designation
· auction airport landing slots
· limit state aid
Revise dispute settlement process
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Table 2 Outline of policy proposals on market access
rules
Accept GATT/GATS principles Restate the relevance of the principles of the world
trading system to air transport and therefore the use of
those principles as a benchmark for evaluating
subsequent proposals, and also for the purpose of
sustaining the pressure to include all aspects of air
transport in the GATS.
within bilateralism
Grant automatic 3rds and 4ths Countries at each end of a route agree to not impose
restrictions on the number or capacities of carriers based
in either party - restrictions are maintained on airlines
from third countries (beyond point and intermediate
point rules are negotiable).
Open charter markets Relax market access restrictions only in markets for
charter flights.
Permit open skies at 2nd airports Relax market access restrictions only on routes to
secondary airports.
multilateral
Set up regional clubs Relax restrictions on market access among all club
members and allow new members to join on the same
basis as foundation members - applies to passengers and
freight.
Free freight markets A group of economies relax all market access rules to
other members in the freight sector only.
Apply GATS A global approach to market access in both passengers
and freight.
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Figure 1 Open skies framework
A
USA
B
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Table 3 The APEC agenda
Policy proposal APEC framework role APEC active role
Market access
rules
Accept GATT/GATS principles APEC reasserts the
relevance of the GATS
principles to air transport,
which is put on its own
services sector negative list.
within bilateralism
Grant automatic 3rds and 4ths Benefits in terms of competition, but has disadvantages of
bilaterals.
Open charter markets Creates a lead sector which could have a demonstration
effect.
Permit open skies at 2nd airports A first step, especially where hubs are congested.
multilateral
Set up regional clubs APEC monitors sub-group
initiatives including region
to region agreements.
APEC is used as a forum in
which to multilateralise US
Open Skies agreements or
to extend other regional
agreements.
Free freight markets APEC monitors sub-group
initiatives including region
to region agreements.
APEC adopts a policy of free
freight markets amongst its
members, including modes
other than air.
Apply GATS APEC promotes a global
agreement on air transport
under the GATS.
Other issues
Relax ownership rules APEC investment principles
are applied to air transport.
Coordinate competition policy APEC agrees on principles
for the coordination of
competition policy.
APEC examines in more
detail specific air transport
issues, eg, those associated
with auctions of airport
landing slots.
Revise dispute settlement process APEC establishes an air
transport dispute settlement
mechanism.
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Notes
1 This paper was prepared for presentation to the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
APEC Roundtable 1997, 6 August, Singapore. Part of the work reported here was
supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council.
2 The Small Group included 14 economies: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and the United States.
3 See Hewitt (1994), p. 15, for estimates of fifth freedom access to routes in East Asia in
1992/93, which range from 2 to 27 per cent.
4 This section is based on Findlay, Paredes-Molina, Kim and Raguraman (1995), a report
of a meeting hosted by four Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) economies
on these issues. This section also draws on the editors’ overview in Findlay, Chia and
Singh (1997).
5 This OECD report is interesting for the reason that it represents the first occasion on
which an OECD report has contained a dissenting opinion. The ‘Japanese view’ (pp.
147-9) criticises the arguments in favour of liberalisation given in the main report, on
the grounds that liberalisation may lead to lower safety levels, to the creation of
monopolies, to the absence of participation in the market by some countries and to the
lack of service to remote areas, while airport constraints also make it impossible to
compete freely.
6 The current United States–Korea agreement has no capacity restrictions and accepts the
designation of more than one carrier. The new agreement proposed by the United States
would however give the Korean airlines unlimited access to points within the United
States (although not between them) as well as beyond and intermediate rights. The
capacity of the Korean and US airlines to offer this service will be increased once the
new Seoul airport is completed (Dempsey and O’Connor, 1997).
7 Ansett’s domestic Australian operation is now actually completely foreign owned by
News Corporation and Air New Zealand. Ansett New Zealand is now 100% owned by
News Corporation. Ansett’s international operations have been placed into a separate
company which is 51 per cent owned by Australian institutional investors (Findlay and
Kissling, 1997)
8 Snape argues that there is a precedent for this principle in the GATS, Article VII of which
applies to recognition of education achievements or other standards. It says that:
a Member may recognise the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or
licenses or certifications granted in a particular country (through) harmonization or
otherwise… A Member which is party to (such) an agreement shall afford adequate
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opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their accession to such an
agreement or arrangement (and a) Member shall not accord recognition in a manner
which would constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the application of
its standards or criteria… Recognition should be based on multilaterally agreed criteria… .
9 Other issues would also have to be considered in this process, beyond those rights
exchanged in the current versions of US Open Skies agreements. Examples of these
other issues are the competition policy questions discussed below.
10 Bowen (1997) reviews the options for treatment of air transport in AFTA and also
outlines some of the sub-regional arrangements occurring within Southeast Asia,
particularly within the ‘growth triangles’.
11 A recent example is in the negotiations between the United States and Korea on open
skies where the United States wants cargo seventh freedom rights and the Koreans have
yet to agree. Cargo seventh freedom rights are those operated, for example, by a US
aircraft based in Korea (these are similar to fifth freedom rights, except in that case the
aircraft should originate or terminate in the airline’s home country).
12 The privatisation of national carriers may be required as a prior step to dealing with
these issues. The experience in the Asia Pacific region is reviewed by Forsyth (1997).
13 The Australian Productivity Commission (1997) has recently released a report on the
impact of international airline alliances in which it argues that alliances could lead to
lower fares and that concerns about the market power enhancing effects of alliances are
greater in the presence of barriers to entry, including those which are a consequence of
the regulatory system.
14 Findlay and Round (1997) and Kim (1997) examine some of the options for managing
the transition to multiple designation, in the former case by applying the administrative
methods used in Australia and in the latter by applying the formula approach used in
Korea.
15 The importance of resolving issues of airport access, through the use of an auction
mechanism which is called ‘Landing Slots Plus’, is stressed by Findlay, Hufbauer and
Jaggi (1996).
16 The OECD report contains an extensive discussion of issues associated with limits to
state aid, including the issue of support for remote areas. The special issues associated
with the Pacific Island economies are examined by Forsyth and King (1996).
17 Warren and Findlay (1997) compare some of the competition policy issues in
telecommunications and air transport.
18 The first International Air Transport Conference of the Air Transport Research Group of
the World Congress on Transportation Research Society, organised by Tae Oum at
University of British Columbia in June 1997, revealed a large amount of work already
in progress, eg Dresner and Oum (1997), Betancour and Campos (1997), Morrell (1997),
and Gillen, Harris and Oum (1997).
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